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Objectives:  Acute  hospital  reconﬁguration  is  often  presented  as  a  problem  to be solved
by  calculations  of  optimal  design,  a rational  process  amenable  to  inﬂuence  by  open  and
responsive  consultation.  We aimed  to  analyse  factors  in  the  process  and ‘results’  of  hospital
reconﬁguration  in three  case  study  sites  in  the  English  NHS.
Methods:  In-depth  semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  internal  and  exter-
nal  stakeholders  at each  site.  Analysis  within  each  case  was  complemented  by  cross-case
analysis  focusing  on  the  relationships  between  the  features  of  the  origins  and  process  of
reconﬁguration  and progress  in the  implementation  of  plans.
Findings:  We  identiﬁed  a number  of  inter-related  factors  operating  in  the  process  of  imple-
mentation  which  inﬂuenced  the  ‘results’:  the  drivers  for change,  the  reconﬁguration,  its
content (particularly  the  extent  to  which  services  are  withdrawn  or made  less  accessible),
the inﬂuence  of  stakeholders,  such  as  local  politicians,  ﬁnancial  pressures,  and  the  role  of
the management  team.
Conclusions:  We  argue  that  the  differences  in  reconﬁguration  implementation  between  the
three  cases  reﬂected  the  nature  of the  proposed  changes  and  local  politics,  rather than  the
strength  of  the  ‘evidence’  for  change.  National  policy  has  tended  to over-emphasise  the
importance  of consultation  using  ‘evidence’  and  underplays  these  inﬂuencing  factors.
 . Introduction
Many health systems are concerned with the issue of
ow best to conﬁgure their hospital-based services. In
ddition to their other roles, hospitals appear to have a par-
icularly important symbolic role with the public in terms
f representing a strong welfare state [1].  It has also been
rgued that hospitals in the UK have a role in maintain-
ng and improving trust in the NHS [2].  Proposed changes
o hospital services therefore often create high proﬁle, con-
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tentious debates locally, and sometimes nationally (see e.g.
[3]).
The term ‘reconﬁguration’ has been used in the context
of health policy in the UK to describe changes to hospital
services. Earlier changes, for example in the 1980s, were
referred to as ‘rationalisation’ or ‘retrenchment’ [4].  These
terms may  be seen by stakeholders, such as the media
and the public, as euphemisms for ‘cutback management’,
changes driven by ﬁnancial concerns. A Department of
Health (DH) report describes reconﬁguration as ‘synony-
mous with major service change, service improvement and
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.delivering value for money for the taxpayer’ [5].  There is
no one, agreed deﬁnition for the purposes of the study on
which this paper is based; therefore, we have developed
this one:
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DH funding to support the process.
We  identiﬁed a list of core key informants to be inter-
viewed in each trust (Table 1). To this core group we added
further clinicians, managers, and stakeholders from outside
Table 1
stakeholders interviewed in all three case studies.
Internal stakeholders External stakeholders
Chair of Board Strategic Health Authoritiesa
Chief Executive Ofﬁcer Primary Care Trustsb
Director of Nursing Social Services
Medical Director Overview and Scrutiny Committeesc
Project Manager Member of Parliament (MP)
Financial Director Local Media
Director of
Modernization/Service
Re-design
a A type of English NHS organisation, created in 2002, responsible for
strategic planning and maintaining quality in NHS services across several
Primary Care Trusts.
b A type of English NHS organisation, created in 2002, which commis-
sions services, sometimes provides community services, and co-ordinatesN. Fulop et al. / Healt
“A deliberately induced change of some signiﬁcance
in the distribution of medical, surgical, diagnostic and
ancillary specialties that are available in each hospital
or other secondary or tertiary acute care unit in locality,
region or health care administrative area” [6].
Although it may  be associated with mergers, or the
formation of structured networks, reconﬁguration is that
measure of change which directly addresses operational
rather than structural change: hospitals may  merge, form
networks, or change their divisional or governance struc-
tures, without reconﬁguring services.
The driving forces for these changes to hospital services
are related to upward pressure on costs, as a consequence
of new technologies and rising public expectations, in par-
allel with downward pressure from previous periods of
economic recession and political unwillingness to increase
taxes [7].  The most frequent response to these pressures
is to seek ways of limiting costs. As hospitals account
for 40–60% of health expenditure in OECD countries, it
is not surprising that the focus has been on acute hospi-
tals and the way in which they are organised [7].  These
drivers are common across countries in Europe [7],  and
other developed countries [8].  Drivers have also included
improved clinical safety and outcomes, using arguments
relating to improvements in quality predicted through
higher volumes of activity, better medical training, and eas-
ier recruitment and retention of staff [9].  Evidence shows
that higher volumes are associated with improved clinical
outcomes for some conditions and procedures, but gains
are exhausted at relatively low thresholds [10], and the
mechanism for the relationship, if it is causal, is contested
[11]. Downward pressure on doctors’ working hours, par-
ticularly in the UK where hours were traditionally long
from, among other sources [12], the European Working
Time Directive (EWTD) has also provided arguments for
centralisation and reconﬁguration [13].
There is, in general, a paucity of empirical studies on
the reconﬁguration process in the acute sector, particu-
larly on the way the process affected the implementation
of changes. There is a substantial literature on the experi-
ence of closing long stay psychiatric hospitals (e.g. [14,15]),
and there were some studies of ‘rationalisation’ of acute
hospitals in the 1980s [4].  More recently, there are some
examples of studies based on particular local struggles
over closure proposals such as in Kidderminster [3,16–18].
There are also a number of normative and prescriptive
papers which develop modelling tools to help decision-
making (e.g. [19–24]). There is a literature on mergers of
hospitals, although these have not always resulted in ser-
vice reconﬁgurations (e.g. [25,26]), and studies on other
types of relationships between hospitals, such as networks
(see e.g. [27]).
The term ‘reconﬁguration’ has tended to be used in the
UK policy context in a way which suggests a problem to
be solved by calculations of optimal design. The DH and
local health policy makers have often presented it as a
technical matter of optimising bed to population ratios,
or co-locating services that require close connections, and
achieving “rational” resource allocation (e.g. [21]). How-
ever, the evidence base for these optimal ratios is slender,104 (2012) 128– 135 129
and much of it relies largely on rules of thumb endorsed
by established professional clinical institutes, rather than
on careful evaluations. In England, government documents
and policies have increasingly emphasised the role of ‘evi-
dence’ and consultation with the public (e.g. [5]) based on
the assumption that if only the public are involved ‘enough’
and are presented with the ‘right evidence’ they will be
convinced of the need to change.
This paper analyses a number of factors important in
the process and ‘results’ of implementation at a local level
from a study of three cases of reconﬁguration in the English
NHS. Findings are presented indicating the following inter-
related factors: the content and drivers of the proposed
changes, responses of stakeholders, and ﬁnancial pres-
sures, thereby illustrating the complexity of the process.
The paper thereby also provides an analysis of the extent
to which representation of reconﬁguration as a rational
process amenable to inﬂuence by open and responsive con-
sultation is a helpful one.
2. Methods
We used a comparative case study design to enhance
both internal and external validity [28,29]. Yin [30] sug-
gests that case studies are particularly suited to the com-
plex nature of health service systems and are a powerful
way of gathering detailed, in-depth data on organisational
processes and the impact of policy changes [31].
2.1. Case studies and interviewees
Three case study hospital trusts (National Health Service
organisations providing hospital care and often including
more than one hospital site) where reconﬁguration was  in
progress were selected by England’s Department of Health
(DH) as they were part of a pilot programme receiving somegeneral practitioner services).
c Local government committees responsible for reviewing decisions,
performance and policy of local NHS organisations on behalf of the com-
munity, intended to give the NHS some democratic accountability through
an  elected body.
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he trust. Interviewees are summarised in Table 2. Inter-
iews took place from February 2005 to September 2007,
n two periods separated by 18 months, to examine the pro-
ess of reconﬁguration. Two researchers (one for round 1
nd one for round 2) conducted face-to-face interviews,
sually at the interviewee’s workplace. Interviews were
ecorded and transcribed for analysis.
Interviewees were anonymised and we removed details
dentifying the sites from reports of ﬁndings and from this
aper.
.2. Design and analysis
The study focused on reconﬁguration as a process [29].
e combined inductive and deductive approaches [29,32].
he data were analysed using ‘Framework’, a systematic
nd comprehensive method for classifying and interpret-
ng qualitative data [33]. The topic guide for interviews
nd initial broad headings used for analysis drew in issues
dentiﬁed in the literature including drivers of change,
onsultation and involvement of stakeholders, experience
f implementation of reconﬁguration and the impact of
econﬁguration. As new issues emerged we added headings
nd subheadings.
Two researchers independently read interview tran-
cripts and reﬁned ﬁndings after discussion with the full
esearch team. One researcher summarised each response
n a matrix under the initial broad headings and new head-
ngs and subheadings from emerging themes. We  returned
o the dataset several times until all interviews had been
nalysed under the full set of headings. Data were analysed
oth within each case and across cases. The latter analysis
ocused on links between features of the origins and pro-
esses of reconﬁguration and progress in implementation
f plans.
. Results
For each of the three case studies we provide a descrip-
ion of the trust and the planned reconﬁguration, and
nalyses of drivers for change, early implementation, and
ater progress and prospects for the viability of reconﬁg-
red services. Each reconﬁguration involved an attempt
o ensure the viability of a small hospital to maintain
ccess to services for the local community, and each was
ltimately jeopardised by a new scheme for payment for
ospital services, termed payment by results (PbR) but in
act, and acknowledged as, payment for activity [34,35].
bR is designed to facilitate patient choice and compe-
ition between by providers by paying providers a ﬁxed
able 2
roﬁle of case study interviewees.
Type of stakeholder
Internal clinical Internal non-clinical
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Rou
City Trust 7 7 4 4 
Rural  Trust North 7 7 4 4 
Rural  Trust South 6 7 5 5 
Total  number of interviews104 (2012) 128– 135
price for healthcare resource groups according to how sick
the patient is and the cost of the treatment [36]. Compari-
son across the three case study sites identiﬁed the drivers
for and content of the changes, responses of stakeholders,
ﬁnancial pressures, and the approach of the senior man-
agement team as inﬂuential in the process and outcome of
reconﬁguration.
Table 3 summarises the characteristics of the trust and
reconﬁgurations, and the progress of reconﬁguration.
3.1. City Trust
City Trust is in an urban area including both deprived
and more prosperous populations. It comprises a large
teaching hospital (Big Hospital) and a smaller district gen-
eral hospital (DGH) (Small Hospital). The hospitals merged
into a single organisation before the study began and when
reconﬁguration of services at Small Hospital was already
under way. The changes involved narrowing conditions
treated to common ones such as asthma, diabetes and heart
disease, and radical redesign of the patient journey. Some
treatment was  moved to community settings, and the pri-
mary care trust (PCT, see Table 1 for deﬁnition) would share
the delivery of services in the hospital accident and emer-
gency department. This reconﬁguration was  preceded by
the setting up of an NHS diagnostic and treatment centre for
elective surgery. The merger with Big Hospital meant that
specialist services could be provided within the same trust.
The new patient pathway – including early contact with
a consultant – was embedded in the design of a new build-
ing funded through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI, a
public–private partnership scheme in the UK public sector
whereby the private sector provides capital for develop-
ment, which the public sector repays over long periods,
accepting higher costs of capital in the expectation that
they will be more than offset by reduced operating costs
from greater efﬁciency [37]).
Internal interviewees reported that the strongest driver
was  concern about the viability of a small DGH in an
area well-provided by specialist hospitals given pres-
sures, including those from the EWTD, to comply with
stafﬁng and training requirements prescribed by pro-
fessional standard-setting bodies. The designers of this
reconﬁguration hoped, by excelling in the treatment of
common conditions, to stand out in an area well provided
with specialist tertiary centres.
‘. . . they’d been faced with “We’re going to close your
hospital”. We  sold them a package which said “They
won’t close our hospital if we redesign it and do it in a
 External Total
nd 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
3 4 14 15
7 8 18 19
9 11 20 23
52 57
N. Fulop et al. / Health Policy 104 (2012) 128– 135 131
Table  3
Characteristics of trust, reconﬁguration, and ‘results’.
City Trust Rural Trust North Rural Trust South
Sites included in study Big Hospital – large teaching hospital
and Small Hospital – small district
general hospital (DGH). The two
merged shortly before the start of the
study
Medium DGH and Little DGH merged
before reconﬁguration. Merger with
Large DGH – was an element of
reconﬁguration
General Hospital – large DGH, and
Community Hospital – community
hospital
Socio-demographic
issues
Sites  close together in metropolitan
community
Hospitals are in small towns
surrounded by dispersed community
In towns twenty miles apart in isolated
dispersed community in tourist area
Drivers  of change Sustain emergency care given
workforce pressures including
European Working Time Directive and
training requirements
Sustain surgical services at Little DGH
compatible with training requirements
Sustain some obstetrics, gynaecology
and child health services at Little DGH
given training and safety issues
Maintain services in Community
Hospital serving small isolated town
while maintaining clinical standards
given workforce constraints
Consultation Consulted on new building but not
service redesign
Consultations separately on surgery
and obstetrics/gynaecology/child
health
Several public consultations by Trust
and PCT met with public opposition. A
consultation led by new PCT resulted in
review which secured most threatened
services at end of study period
Changes implemented Service changes internal to trust fully
implemented, including new building
and model of care
Positive expected outcomes reported
Almost complete implementation of
reconﬁguration plan
No agreed plan
Changes not
implemented
Some elements involving delivery of
care in community not implemented
because of – PCT had deﬁcit and could
not deliver some of its part of the
Integration of surgical services across
three sites not working as designed,
jeopardising sustainability of Little
DGH’s elective surgical unit
No reconﬁguration achievedreconﬁguration
Low surgical activity in diagnostic and
treatment centre
different way and isn’t this exciting?” And they bought
into that’. Internal stakeholder, Round 1
There was no public consultation speciﬁcally over this
service change, and no public concern was raised about its
introduction. At the ﬁrst round of interviews the operation
of redesigned services had begun. By the second, intervie-
wees reported that elements within Small Hospital were
operating as planned:
‘. . . they basically created a whole model. It’s working
and now we’re putting it up in front and saying, “Look,
you said this couldn’t be done. We’ve done it here. If
we can do it there, why can’t we do it here?”’ External
stakeholder, Round 1
However some community-based and general practice
elements were not implemented because of a PCT deﬁcit,
including a GP-run minor injuries unit in a community hos-
pital, and GP-led minor injuries in the hospital.
The redesign of services in this trust was reported to
be viewed by government as a model which other small
hospitals could follow.
Events outside the trust made the survival of the new
services questionable. The PCT deﬁcit, and loss of its
planned elements to the redesign meant that part of the
unique patient journey was lost. The trust itself went into
deﬁcit during the study period, with the redesigned acute
admission process and the diagnostic and treatment cen-
tre at Small Hospital identiﬁed as contributing signiﬁcantly
to losses, because of low levels of activity. PbR conﬂicted
with an earlier government policy for shifting treatment to
community services [38] which underpinned Small Hospi-
tal’s redesign, by giving incentives for hospitalisation. Someinterviewees also perceived PbR as putting it at a disadvan-
tage with the private sector by ﬁxing NHS service prices
while private hospitals were free to vary prices in response
to the market, and cross-subsidise.
3.2. Rural Trust North
Rural Trust North had three main hospitals in a rural
area dotted with formerly industrial towns. Each was a
separate hospital trust in the recent past. A need to cre-
ate services with sufﬁcient volume for modern training
standards while still accessible to a dispersed and deprived
community drove merger between Medium DGH, a mod-
erately sized DGH, and Little DGH, a smaller hospital 15
miles away. A later merger with Large DGH was an ele-
ment in the reconﬁguration under study. Our study focused
on the relocations of obstetric and emergency surgery ser-
vices, two elements of a larger reconﬁguration. Little DGH’s
emergency surgery and consultant-led obstetrics moved to
Medium DGH, while stroke services, elective surgery and
haematology moved to Little DGH.
Interviewees reported that the main driver for recon-
ﬁguration was the delivery of safe services in Little DGH,
compatible with workforce and training requirements of
regulatory bodies. Consultants in Medium DGH initiated
the plan, and an external expert, appointed to resolve con-
cerns of a PCT, introduced new elements including the
merger with Large DGH. The expert intended this merger
to introduce higher volumes of elective surgery to Little
DGH’s new theatres built with PFI funding.
Internal interviewees reported that the reconﬁguration
was implemented to time and on budget, in accordance
with a well developed plan.
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‘The biggest strength . . . is the project management
and I would say that that was strong both internally,
but also strong performance management by the then
health authority to ensure that the changes were imple-
mented’. Internal non-clinical stakeholder, Round 2
Their public consultations met  with and overcame
pposition and they reported introducing some elements
f the plan, including Little DGH’s midwifery-led unit, as a
esult of consultation.
However, some internal clinical interviewees at Little
GH felt vulnerable, arguing that management saw the site
s a ﬁrst choice for cuts. They, and interviewees at Medium
GH, reported that senior clinicians at Large DGH were
eluctant partners to the merger, and perceived the devel-
pment of Little DGH as being at the expense of a necessary
xpansion of capacity on their own site. Some respondents
t other sites believed that providing services at Little DGH
onﬂicted with Large DGH consultants’ private work. They
ad not referred to the Little DGH surgical unit to the level
oped for:
‘. . . a huge reluctance of people to change the way  they
work and perhaps an element of reluctance of manage-
ment to, you know “Come on guys, we want you to go
and do your operative, your elective operative stuff at
Little DGH”’. Internal clinical stakeholder, Round 2
Rural Trust North was the only case study of the three
ot to experience ﬁnancial problems. The NHS organisa-
ions in the area including its PCTs were ﬁnancially sound.
owerful members of government represented local con-
tituencies, and they and local government supported the
rust management.
By the second round of interviews, interviewees were
till satisﬁed at the progress of the reconﬁguration,
lthough they reported continued lack of commitment to
he merged trust from Large DGH clinicians. Several direc-
orates had merged across the trust. Most single-hospital
irectorates were in Large DGH. Little DGH clinical inter-
iewees’ concerns about their site’s viability remained.
The long-term sustainability of the services at Little DGH
as poor. Under PbR the elective theatres and midwifery-
ed unit looked uneconomic because of low activity levels.
he trust was still committed to PFI payments for the
uilding.
.3. Rural Trust South
Rural Trust South is in a rural, tourist area. General
ospital is a large DGH in a central town, and Commu-
ity Hospital, a small hospital in a town 25 miles away.
he trust must accommodate peaks in demand at holiday
imes and make services accessible to a dispersed commu-
ity. The PCT and trust developed reconﬁguration plans to
ring more serious urgent cases from Community Hospital
o General Hospital over nearly a decade.
Consultants at General Hospital became anxious about
afe provision of services at Community Hospital, partic-
larly emergency medical and surgical admissions and
naesthetic cover, given workforce constraints. The trust
nd PCT were concerned to maintain a viable unit on the104 (2012) 128– 135
site because of the strength of community attachment to
local provision.
‘I  would never ever recommend the service to be with-
drawn if it was a great service that was utterly sensible,
but was expensive. It’s just that this service is not sensi-
ble, it’s not safe and it’s costing a fortune and all of those
three put together the reason that that is happening is
because the, the local politicians and health groups [in
the area of Community Hospital] are holding this hos-
pital to ransom, and threatening both individuals and
the organisation with all sorts if anybody touches our
hospital and tries to downgrade it any further’. Internal
clinical stakeholder, Round 2
We observed several attempts to agree a reconﬁgura-
tion, rather than a reconﬁguration process. Consultation
on each plan, and on a leaked tentative proposal, sparked
vehement protest including street demonstrations. Twice
a Minister of Health intervened to promise that existing
services would be maintained, overruling trust and PCT
proposals.
A joint body with community involvement, with a chair
trusted by the community from outside the area, and advice
from an outside expert, made one attempt at resolution.
The resulting plan, initially acceptable to both sides, proved
technically impractical to the trust and gave insufﬁcient
security to campaigners. The trust made a new proposal
for increased elective, low risk and outpatient activity at
Community Hospital, while services deemed risky were
moved to General Hospital. The community campaign was
suspicious of all moves of services away from Commu-
nity Hospital, which it attributed to attempts to cut costs.
A trust deﬁcit emerging during study period supported
these entrenched views. The campaign was strengthened
by funding and political support from local councils and
members of parliament opposed to the party of govern-
ment who  perceived NHS problems as government failings.
As data collection ended a new county-wide PCT
replaced the previous smaller ones, and initiated a ser-
vice review. The review had a deliberately conciliatory
approach to the community campaign, and made early
commitments to maintaining some threatened services at
Community Hospital.
Resolution of Rural Trust South’s clinical concerns
would mean restoring the community campaign’s conﬁ-
dence in NHS organisations, or reducing its impact. The
new PCT’s conciliatory approach seemed to be productive,
and a local government reorganisation has removed the
tier of government which funded the campaign. Commu-
nity Hospital was economically unviable under PbR. The
ﬁnancial viability of Community Hospital may prove more
intractable.
3.4. Cross-case analysis
At City Trust and Rural Trust North case study sites,
substantial changes were made in accordance with a recon-
ﬁguration plan, while at Rural Trust South, a plan was yet
to be agreed. At City Trust, progress seemed to have stalled
by the end of data collection, because of ﬁnancial problems,
and the future of all three trusts was jeopardised by ﬁnan-
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Table  4
Factors inﬂuencing ‘results’.
City Trust Rural Trust North Rural Trust South
Characteristics of
reconﬁguration
with impact on
local population
Involved no removal of services;
modern building replaced a
dilapidated one, designed around the
patient journey
Removal of services from isolated
community, and some enhancement of
existing services. Depended on
integrated operation of 3
geographically distant units
No model of care presented which met
internal objective to remove clinically
‘unsafe’ service while addressing
community concerns about access
Response to
reconﬁguration
and consultation
No concerns expressed about redesign
by  external stakeholders
Concerns expressed some of which
resulted in change to reconﬁguration
plan e.g. introducing a midwifery-led
unit
Community campaign organised large
demonstrations, supported by other
external stakeholders, and rejected all
plans put forward by trust
National politics Government saw small hospital as a
model for sustaining other Small
Hospitals
Powerful members of government
represented the area in parliament and
local councils were supportive of trust
MPs and all local authorities were from
political parties opposed to the party of
government and partly blamed
government policy for problems with
health services. Two government ministers
had visited the area at the time of protests
and supported the local community
position against the trust
Local  events with
ﬁnancial impact
PCT deﬁcit leading to loss of PCT
provision of community services
integral to redesign
Trust deﬁcit changed trust’s priorities
Rural Trust North is the only study
trust not have to deal with deﬁcits of
its  own or in its health economy
Trust deﬁcit emerged, and grew, over
study period
National policy
with ﬁnancial
impact
Payment by results (PbR) penalised the
model which shifted much
traditionally acute care to community,
and contributed to low surgical activity
by making diagnostic and treatment
centre less competitive
Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
payments at Small Hospital
contributed to costs at this site
Financial sustainability was
jeopardised by PbR with impact on
sustainability and competitiveness
PFI payments for Little DGH added to
overheads
PbR threatened the sustainability of
services at Community Hospitalcial problems in the pipeline, made more apparent by PbR.
Table 4 summarises factors inﬂuencing ‘results’.
3.4.1. Drivers for and content of change
All three reconﬁgurations were driven by attempts to
provide accessible services in small units, but that super-
ﬁcial resemblance concealed differences. At City Trust,
management anticipated an economic threat to the small
unit, and devised a solution (which involved no loss of
services), by seeking a niche in the wider health econ-
omy  without any evidence of community concern, while
in Rural Trust North and Rural Trust South, with more dis-
persed communities, the attempt to preserve small units
was in response to community concerns. Clinicians and
managers sought to ensure a conﬁguration of services at
these units which was safe and viable, removing services
to other sites which they believed were more safely or eco-
nomically delivered at higher volume.
3.4.2. Inﬂuence of stakeholders
Community concerns also inﬂuenced the progress of
reconﬁguration, at Rural Trust South obstructing the agree-
ment of a plan, and at Rural Trust North being apparently
managed and overcome, while no signiﬁcant community
opposition was reported at City Trust. Other stakeholders –
local and national politicians – also inﬂuenced the progress
of reconﬁguration. At Rural Trust North particularly, polit-
ical support seemed to protect the trust management’s
efforts, while at Rural Trust South, political support andﬁnancial contributions from local government strength-
ened community opposition to reconﬁguration plans.
3.4.3. Financial pressures
The ﬁnancial state of the health economy changed
the course of City Trust’s reconﬁguration when the PCT’s
ﬁnancial problems meant that PCT elements were not
implemented. The trust’s own deﬁcit led to close examina-
tion of the viability of reconﬁgured services. At Rural Trust
South, the trust’s deﬁcit deepened community mistrust in
reconﬁguration attempts. At Rural Trust North, a robust
health economy seems to have facilitated implementation
of plans.
3.4.4. Senior management approach
The cohesiveness of the senior management team
seemed to be related to the progress of reconﬁguration
at City Trust and Rural Trust North. At City Trust, the
reconﬁguration was initiated when Small Hospital was  an
independent trust reported as having a dynamic and inno-
vative culture, and initially the board of City Trust was
dominated by Small Hospital Trust board members. Over
the course of the study, these members were replaced by
outsiders who looked more critically at the reconﬁgura-
tion in the light of the trust’s deﬁcit and those elsewhere
in the health economy. Rural Trust North’s board was
reported to be cohesive and to share a project management
approach. Membership did not change over the period of
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ata collection, unlike that of Rural Trust South which had
onsiderable turnover.
. Discussion and conclusions
Our study of hospital reconﬁguration illustrates a range
f ‘results’: in one case (City Trust), reconﬁguration plans
ere implemented fully; in the second they were partially
mplemented (Rural Trust North); and in the third they
ere not implemented at all (Rural Trust South). We  iden-
ify a number of important, inter-related, factors in the
rocess of implementation which inﬂuenced these ‘results’
.e. what was implemented, conﬁrming what other stud-
es of local implementation of national policies have found
e.g. [4,26,39,40]) i.e. a mix  of responding to other national
olicies which conﬂict with this one and local contexts
nd processes. The content of reconﬁguration (particularly
he extent to which services are withdrawn or made less
ccessible) and the related strength of local opposition
merged as inﬂuential in the outcome of reconﬁguration.
here reconﬁguration was perceived as a ‘downgrading’ of
ervice provision, there was more active internal (profes-
ional) and external stakeholder involvement as illustrated
n Rural Trust North and Rural Trust South, whereas in
ases where changes were not perceived as ‘downgrading’
ecause services were not being moved from one site to
nother or closing, as in City Trust, there was less conﬂict.
Local party politics and their relationship to national
arty politics played an important role in strengthening the
ocal opposition or creating a secure environment for the
rust’s management. This was evident in Rural Trust North
nd Rural Trust South where in the former, local politicians
ere inﬂuential in the party of national government facil-
tating a more secure environment for change; while in
ural Trust South, local politicians from opposing parties
oined forces with public opposition to change. However,
n each case, there was a complex web of political and other
elationships that need to be taken into account.
The ﬁnancial context was important in all three cases
n terms of the national context of the change in funding
rrangements (PbR) and in City Trust and Rural Trust South
n terms of speciﬁc local difﬁculties. Rural Trust North,
hich had nationally inﬂuential MPs, seemed to be cush-
oned from these effects compared with the other two. PbR
ffected all three trusts’ reconﬁguration plans contributing
o threatening the sustainability of these organisations by
mposing a ﬁxed payment which did not cover high over-
eads of a small unit and making this shortfall transparent
41]. In two trusts, the legacy of PFI buildings compounded
his. Others have noted the inﬂexibility of PFI arrangements
o adapt to new circumstances [42].
The role of the senior management team was  impor-
ant in both the process and outcome of reconﬁguration,
lthough perhaps mediated by other factors. The turbu-
ent context for Rural Trust South was mirrored by a high
urnover in senior management, whereas City Trust and
ural Trust North had highly committed and cohesive
enior management teams which designed and initiated
mplementation.
These factors provided context for the consultation pro-
esses (or lack thereof) in all three cases. The differences104 (2012) 128– 135
between the three cases reﬂected the nature of the pro-
posed changes and local politics rather than the strength
of the ‘evidence’ for change. National policy has tended
to over-emphasise the importance of consultation using
‘evidence’ and underplay these contextual factors (see e.g.
[5]).
We may  be entering a new period of rationalisation
and reconﬁguration in the NHS in England. The NHS is
charged with saving £20bn by 2015, and the current pro-
posed reforms including ‘any willing provider’, whereby
private companies will be allowed to compete with the NHS
for patients, may  add to the pressure on the viability of indi-
vidual units and whole hospitals. On the other hand, in May
2010 the newly elected coalition government announced
an end to ‘top-down forced closures’ and the need for NHS
trusts to pass several tests to allow a closure: support from
payers, better public and patient engagement, and clear
clinical evidence to justify the change [43] – underlining
the previous government’s belief in a rational, technical
process.
This paper highlights the importance of using multiple,
longitudinal cases in this study of hospital reconﬁguration
as it has been able to uncover these contextual factors and
how they inter-relate [44]. Although the three case studies
provide examples of different types of reconﬁguration, as
well as contrasting in the socio-economic characteristics of
their populations, and their national and local political con-
text, the fact that they had been in receipt of some funds to
support the reconﬁguration process, may  mean they dif-
fer in some important ways from other reconﬁgurations.
However, differences between the cases in terms of context
and content enable us to be conﬁdent that relations among
these factors constitute a robust analysis of the process and
‘results’ of reconﬁguration.
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